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The iconoclastic modernism of the May 4th was scarcely the 
only vision of modernity in Republican China. While the 
intellectual history of these alternative views has received some 
attention in the scholarship (Furth 1976), its social history has 
not. Urban, middle-class social forms in the Republic--from 
charitable societies to the family--were dominated by models of 
modernity that have been obscured by the May 4th narrative which 
found no place for "tradition" in its ideal of the emancipated 
individual. At about the same time that May 4th ideals were 
galvanizing a certain segment of the intelligentsia, a new, much 
more broadly-based type of association was emerging in urban 
China with ties that linked it (to a greater or lesser degree 
depending upon the particular association) organically to rural 
and popular culture. In this paper I shall discuss the 
construction of womens' identities within this middle-class 
milieu. I argue that the reconceptualization of morality and 
spirituality in this milieu had profound implications for the 
identities of women. In the second part of the paper, I focus 
upon the gap between the pedagogy of the leadership and the life- 
stories of the'women themselves in one of these associations, the 
Daodehui or the Morality Society. 
For the moment I shall call these associations modern, 
redemptive societies. Apart from the Morality Society, they 
include in their numbers the Dao Yuan (Society of the Way) and 
its partner, the Hongwanzihui or Red Swastika Society, the 
Tongshanshe or the Fellowship of Goodness , the Zailijiao (The 
Teaching of the Abiding Principle) the Shijie Zongjiao Datonghui 
(Society for the Great Unity of World Religions first organized 
in Sichuan in 1915 as the Wushanshe), and the Yiguandao (Way of 
Pervading Unity), among many others. Some of these such as the 
Fellowship of Goodness claimed a following of 30 million in 1929 
[Suemitsu 1932, 2521 and the Red Swastika Society, a following of 
7 to 10 million in 1937 [Takizawa 671.~ While these claims are 
likely to be highly exaggerated, nonetheless, officials of 
Japanese puppet administrations believed that they commanded a 
much larger following than modern Chinese scholars, who looked 
down on them, were prepared to believe. Thus, Wing Tsit-chan who 
regarded them as "negative in outlook, utilitarian in purpose, 
and superstitious in belief" [Chan 1671, cites a figure of 30,000 
members (not followers) for the Red Swastika Society in 1927 
[Chan 1641. 
To be sure, these societies were significantly different 
from each other--a topic for another essay--but what they have in 
common is a remarkable indicator of the new milieu of urban life 
across China. The great majority of these societies were premised 
upon an East versus West polarity where the West represented 
science and material culture and East Asian civilizations 
represented the hope for spiritual and moral regeneration of the 
world. These societies, most of which were established or 
* Wing-tsit Chan writes that the Fellowship of Goodness 
claimed more than a thousand branches in all parts of China 
proper and Manchuria in 1923 [Chan 1651. Suemitsu believes that 
the Red Swastika had a following of 3 million in 1932 [Suemitsu 
3021. 
flourished at the time of World War I, sought to bring peace and 
morality to a world devastated by war and greed by supplementing 
the material civilization of the West with the spiritual 
civilization of the East. They offered their spiritual solution 
in the form of a religious universalism whereby Confucianism, 
Daoism, Buddhism, Islam and Christianity all embodied the same 
spirit of universal spirituality. Their redemptive message drew 
on a rich vein of late imperial gentry syncretism (saniiaohevi) 
which first gained popularity in the late Ming period in the late 
16th and 17th centuries. This movement which involved the 
Confucian gentry as well as Daoist and Buddhist leaders was 
inspired by Wang Yangming's commitment to the moral self- 
transformation of ordinary people and urged the extinguishing of 
worldly desires and engagement in moral action [Chow 1994, 21- 
251. 
But this 20th century syncretism was mobilized to adapt to 
modern discourses. Organized with charters and by-laws, armed 
with a strong this-worldly orientation and a rhetoric of worldly 
redemption, these societies resembled other modern religious and 
morality societies all over the world. Indeed, while the red 
swastika of the society with that name could and should be 
understood in Buddhist terms, it was and should also be seen as 
modelled upon--an Eastern equivalent of--the Red Cross Society. 
[Suemitsu 3541 Perhaps their participation in a modern discourse 
is revealed most clearly by their allegiance to that most 
fundamentally modern discourse: evolutionism or the linear 
History of progress. Many of their arguments and propositions 
were framed by this discourse of evolutionary History. They 
argued that human evolution (iinhual would stall and turn even 
more destructive if the present trend towards hedonistic 
materialism (exemplified by the West) was not countered by moral 
and spiritual regeneration [MDNJ 4:l; Takizawa 6 7 1 .  Thus their 
spiritualism was dedicated to restoring humanity's evolution to 
perfection. 
The pervasive nature of this symbiotic formulation of 
modernity in China does not need much demonstration. The KMT 
regime of the 1930s subscribed precisely to such a dualistic 
formulation and the New Life movement exemplified the urge to 
revitalize the material conditions of modernity through a 
muscular or rather, ascetic, Confucian moralism. This conception 
is most strikingly identified with a modernist, evolutionary 
framework in Chen Lifu's philosophy of a parallel material and 
spiritual evolutionism. Chen's parallelism also represents one of 
the more creative means of accomodating the nation's past in a 
modern future so characteristic of nationalist ideology the world 
over. Chen argues that the evolution of material civilization 
without spiritual progress inevitably leads to the enslavement of 
humankind by things [Chen 1281. Even while it grasps the 
livelihood of the people as the supreme goal, the New Life 
movement will inject.mora1 qualities from the essence of Chinese 
civilization into this effort so that history can be propelled 
into civilizational perfection--Datong or the Great Unity [Chen 
1331. 
Given the discursive affinities between many of these 
societies and the KMT, it is surprising to find that from 1927, 
the KMT outlawed and persecuted many of these societies, 
including the Morality Society [Otani 69, 123; Suemitsu 251, 
2551. The KMT regime condemned these societies as riven by 
superstitions and dominated by local bullies and warlords. 
Central to understanding this hostility, I believe, is the way in 
which the KMT devised its representation of tradition to exclude 
popular religious practices--in part at least to excise and 
contain the power of religious heterodoxy. Thus, I have argued 
elsewhere [Duara 1995, chapter 31 that the KMT characterization 
of the spiritual as part of China's national essence incorporated 
modern, licensed religions, while it proscribed as superstition a 
range of religious societies from the heterodox to those it 
suspected of political opposition. Included among these were not 
only sectarian and several secret societies, but also most of the 
modern, redemptive societies. In keeping with their syncretist 
heritage, many of the'religious practices of these redemptive 
societies were, in fact, drawn from popular culture. For 
instance, the popularity of the Daoyuan or the Red Swastika 
Society was often attributed to its practice of divination or 
planchette [Suemitsu 3021. Thus several of these societies drew 
from late imperial syncretism not only through their synthesis of 
different religious teachings, but also in their accomodation of 
popular gods and practices which made them a much more organic 
part of Chinese societg. In contrast, the KMT appears to have 
espoused a more elitist variant of the dualistic formulation of 
modernity. 
Apart from the East versus West or spiritual/moral versus 
material duality, these societies were also premised upon another 
duality: the outer versus the inner. Externally, these societies 
were committed to benevolent works or philanthropy (cishan shiye) 
including traditional charities such as soup kitchens and poor 
houses, and also modern hospitals, schools and contributions to 
international relief works. Thus for instance the Hongwanzihui, 
which had branches in Paris, London and Tokyo and had professors 
of Esperanto among its members, contributed substantially not 
only to relief works in China but also to the Tokyo earthquake 
and natural disasters in the Soviet Union [Suemitsu 292-3051. The 
Zailijiao, which claimed a membership of between 300, 000 to 
several million (it had 48 centers in Tianjin alone) developed 
drug rehabilitation centers using herbal medicines and self- 
cultivation techniques (zhenashen) which were said to fully cure 
over 200 opium addicts a year [Suemitsu 262-31. The inner 
dimension of these societies' activities were focused upon 
producing the self-cultivating subject. Such self-cultivation 
(ziii xiuvana, xiushen) ranged from the exercise of a strict 
disciplinary regimen upon members to cultivating the habit of 
close moral and spiritual introspection designed to produce the 
self-cultivating subject as the moral citizen of the new world. 
See Chow pp. 22-24, for late imperial syncretism. 
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The disciplinary regimen in some societies emphasized strict vows 
of abstinence from drugs, meats, and alcohol, sometimes, quasi- 
renunciation of the family, and in others, detailed codes of 
moral behaviour and bodily comportment [Suemitsu 266, 326-328; 
Takizawa 76-78; Chan 164-1671. Most societies combined all three. 
The Space of Authenticity in Modernity 
In this paper, I am centrally concerned with the production 
of this interior space in which the self is constituted or 
interpellated in Louis Althusser's terms (1971). Interpellation 
is the act by which the individual recognizes him or herself in 
the appellation pronounced by the other, as when we turn around 
upon hearing the policeman call out "Hey you". How do social 
powers authorize themselves to pronounce that name, to define 
that representation with which the individual is pre-pared to 
identify, or to negotiate her identification? Thus my first 
concern is with the manner in which a space of inviolability is 
created which authorizes certain powers to define a 
representation of the self and render it immune to challenges 
both from within (the self itself) and from external sources such 
as alternative discourses. 
The inviolability of this space is secured by the. 
symbolization of certain realms--such as the spiritual and moral, 
the essence of a culture, the traditions of a nation, the purity 
of woman--as sacred or authentic. Within this space, social power 
can be cloaked in the robes of a pure and inner authenticity, the 
sacred space of (or in) the secular and modern. While this space 
exists in all societies, modern and pre-modern, it serves a 
rather special function in modern societies dominated by the 
discourse of linear, evolutionary History: the function of the 
unchanging in evolution. Elsewhere I have dwelt on the historical 
discourse that posits scientific civilization and rational self- 
consciousness as the telos of History [Duara 1995 chapter 11. 
Paul Ricoeur suggests that the anxiety associated with the linear 
representation of phenomenological time--time as a succession of 
instants--cannot be fully overcome by historical narratives of 
continuity. Linear history has to develop an artifice which 
allows it to narrate over the succession of "nows", to negotiate 
or conceal the aporia between the deadness of the past and the 
contemporary experience of it [Ricoeur 1984:l-30; 1988:138-1411. 
For linear histories this artifice is the subject of History--the 
nation, race, or class. The subject enables History by being the 
living essence of the past, but also by simultaneously being free 
from the hold of the past: that which evolves is that which 
remains even as it changes. 
Thus, the space of authenticity is often identifiable with 
the unchanging essence from the past that serves a necessary 
function as the subject of a linear History. As I see it, this 
unchanging essence is, of course, by no means unchanging, but 
neither is it a pure invention as some culture theorists might 
allege. It is a repeatedly re-constituted "essence" whose 
historicity is concealed by its pace of change which is not 
synchronous with change in other  sphere^.^ In locating this 
sphere of authenticity within the problematic of linear History, 
I wish to separate it from a purely or primarily psychologistic 
reading of these essences and traditions. Thus while Joseph 
Levenson's interpretation of the re-creations and manipulations 
of "tradition" as psychologically comforting to modern Chinese 
intellectuals who needed to assert the particularity of Chinese 
history in the face of the overwhelming superiority of scientific 
civilization and values may have been true for some intellectuals 
at some time and place, the re-construction of tradition had 
other meanings and functions not reducible to salving the 
inferiority complex of Chinese intellectuals. All nations and 
societies that see themselves as subjects progressing or evolving 
through linear time need to constitute an "unchanging core" in 
order to recognize themselves in their ever-changing 
circumstances. Hence the role of tradition or sacred national 
symbols or core values in Britain or France or America. What is 
interesting about the Chinese and other non-western cases is that 
the aporia of having to be of the past and also not of it is 
presented as having to be both Eastern and Western. Thus there is 
an imbrication between Easternness, national or cultural essence, 
Similarly, by "traditionu I refer not to some abiding 
essence or primordial inheritance, a view found both in 
nationalist and modernization paradigms of our times. I see it 
rather as a discursive production, an inheritance that is re- ' 
signified in the inheriting process--a re-presentation [See Duara 
1995, ch.31. It is precisely because the past is reproduced or 
co-produced by the present that there is so much diversity and 
contestation over tradition and that characterizations of this 
tradition are so changeable over time. 
and the space of authenticity, each functionally different, but 
each authorizing the other. 
Of course, the inviolable space of authenticity need not 
necessarily be associated with all these other functions. Thus 
communist ideology in China developed a space of authenticity 
without any help from Easterness, but it probably did need some 
notion of an abiding communist or nationalist essence in the 
march towards progress (change) that the party heralded. In a 
rich and fascinating essay on female images and the national myth 
in the PRC before 1980, Meng Yue argues that the production of 
such a space of interiority was necessary even for iconoclastic 
radicals such as the Chinese communists in order to anchor 
communist ideals within the individual self. She suggests that it 
was through the figure of the de-sexed, un-bodied woman in PRC 
literature--the figure of purity--that the triumph of class 
struggle was secured. Ideally, both men and women gained their 
sense of the authentic classless self through the model of the 
self-denying, sacrificing (for the state, according to Meng), 
sexless woman. "On the one hand, the state's political discourse 
translated itself through women into the private context of 
desire, love, marriage, divorce and familial relations, and on 
the other, it turned woman into an agent politicizing desire, 
love, and family relations by delimiting and repressing, 
sexuality, self and all private emotions."[Meng 1181. Not only 
did such a woman enshrine all that was pure and true in communist 
discourse, she also symbolized that unchanging core--the 
stillness of the true--whereby communism could recognize itself 
in the march of change. 
Authenticity and the Construction of Nationalist Patriarchy 
Notwithstanding the partial exception of the Communist case, 
the homology between the dualities of East versus West and 
essential versus evolving was characteristic of much non-western 
modern thought in the first half of the 20th century, and 
typically authorized the space of authenticity in several Asian 
societies of the time. Partha Chatterjee's work on the colonized 
middle-class in Bengal, which has greatly aided my own 
explorations of the space of authenticity, shows us how 
nationalist ideology in late 19th century India appropriated the 
middle-class production of a sphere that he calls the inner 
domain of sovereignty of nationalist ideology. Like so much 
Chinese nationalism discussed above, Indian nationalism was built 
upon a duality of the scientific and material versus the 
spiritual and cultural. Thus while the Indian nation had much to 
learn from the material and scientific civilization of the West, 
in spiritual matters, India had the upper hand and a contribution 
to make to world civilization [Chatterjee esp. ch. 6 1 .  
Chatterjee's particular contribution is to show how this 
dualism was organized in a way to create an inner realm of 
national life that could not be contested by the colonial power. 
19th century Bengali middle class intellectuals had re-worked 
certain historical texts to define the ideal "woman" and 
distinguish her from depictions of the "traditional" (ie. recent 
historical, rather than the quintessential) Bengali women, from 
depictions of contemporary lower-class women, and from the figure 
of the Western, materialist, and masculinized woman. Modern 
Indian nationalism found this trope of the enlightened but 
quintessentially "traditional" woman to be highly congenial and 
appropriated it as the core of the essential nation. Tradition 
thus came to mark a realm of inner sovereignty that was 
simultaneously demarcated as domestic, spiritual and feminine. 
The Hindu nationalist representation of woman--educated and 
educating, but personifying the spiritual virtues of domesticity- 
-gave body to this national essence. While on the one hand, this 
lofty idealization of the Hindu woman provided new aspirations 
for some women, it also represented a new nationalist patriarchy 
and produced a sense of betrayal for women whose real lives could 
not match this idealization [Chatterjee chs. 6-71. 
The creation of an inner realm in the modern discourses of 
Republican China was important in authorizing a space that was 
off-limits, less to colonial powers than to westernizing forces 
within China--most significantly the social forces spawned by the 
May 4th movement. It is hardly a coincidence that many of these 
redemptive modern societies emerged in the last years of 1910s or 
in the early 1920s and Sun Yat-sen's valorization of Chinese 
traditional virtues within nationalist rhetoric took place at 
around the same time as the May 4th movement. As a result, two 
very different nationalistic representations of women emerged in 
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the radically anti-Confucian, indeed, anti-familial, nationalist 
woman, and on the other, the varieties of more conservative 
constructions of woman as the soul of tradition-within-modernity 
with which.we are concerned here. These two conflicting 
representations of women yielded a great deal of violence in the 
1920s and 1930s--especially after the split between the KMT and 
CCP in 1927--when thousands of "modern" women were killed by the 
KMT forces because they were accused of "free love", or 
sometimes simply because they had bobbed hair, unbound feet, or a 
local reputation for opposing familial authority [Diamond 6-71. 
While they were surely killed because they were marked by these 
signs as communist (whether or not they were), the causal logic 
worked in both directions. Communism itself was illegitimate 
significantly because such women and their behaviour despoiled 
the innermost purity of Chinese culture. 
Nationalists and social reformers brought women into the 
modern world by establishing a new nationalist patriarchy. From 
its inception at the end of the 19th century, modern Chinese 
nationalism linked the liberation of women to the cause of 
national strength. Abolition of footbinding, women's education, 
the need for pre-natal care, became major issues in the reform 
movement of the late 19th century led by Kang Youwei and his 
colleagues, because, as Kazuko Ono writes, these issues became 
"linked to the nation's survival or demise, its strength or 
weakness, through the education of children" [Ono 271. While 
there were some notable efforts by women writers themselves to 
dissociate women's liberation from the national cause [See for 
instance Li and Zhang 1975: esp. 463-73, through the early 
decades of the 20th century the legitimacy of the former 
continued to remain dependent on the latter. The republican 
nationalist patriarchy developed by colonizing or transferring to 
itself certain ideals of womanly virtue from historical 
patriarchies. Even as this nationalism was authenticated, or 
rather authenticized, by traditional virtues, these virtues were 
simultaneously infused with values from the discourses of modern 
nationalism. Women were to participate as modern citizens in the 
public sphere of the nation, but they were also expected to 
personify the essence of the national tradition. 
Consider a lecture by the leading KMT nationalist Wang 
Jingwei in a girls' school in 1924: Wang observes that the 
conflict between the old and the new in society can be seen as 
the clash between the school which is the nucleus of the new 
thought and the family which preserves the old ways. He urges 
that in order for China to progress in this competitive world of 
nation-states, it is important for students to take control over 
society and reform its evil customs. He recognizes that it is 
easy for them to succumb to the control of the family and be 
assimilated into society, but he implores them not to take this 
path. He suggests that it is particularly important for girls' 
schools to nourish a spirit of social reform among their students 
since in their present state they stand as obstacles to national 
progress [Wang 106-73. 
Having framed his talk within the evolutionary discourse of 
modernity, Wang's second theme is about the importance of 
choosing the right kind of education. He suggests that although 
Chinese' traditions have a lot that is bad, it has one strength: 
the cultivation of a long tradition of self-sacrifice (xishenq) 
among females, whether in their natal home where they willingly 
sacrificed their happiness for the sake of their parents, or for 
the sake of their husbands after marriage, or for the sake of 
their sons in old age. Doubtless, the old society often used this 
blind self-sacrifice to bury their freedom. But women should know 
that the responsibility of the individual is heavy and should not 
be exploited (livonq) by society. If they then sacrifice 
themselves out of true conviction (zhenzhende ainuaan), then such 
conduct is proper, and, indeed, highly admirable. This spirit of 
self-sacrifice actually forms the indispensable basis of all 
morality--Confucian, Buddhist and Christian. "Chinese women are 
rich--in the spirit of self-sacrifice. If we can properly direct 
this spirit towards ...[ the collectivity] and use it, then we can 
on the one hand, perhaps preserve a little of the essence 
(iinasui) of the teachings of several thousand years, and on the 
other, still plant the roots of modern liberatory thought. In 
seeking education for girls I hope we can uphold our mission to 
inherit the past to enlighten posterity [chenaxian aihou]" [Wang 
1081. Thus Wang identifies woman as the locus of unchanging 
authenticity not by sanctifying the home and domesticity--as in 
India--but by redirecting the virtue of self-sacrifice to the 
nation. This new patriarchy demands a non-physical and non- 
materialist woman as the symbol of national essence. 
Re-reading Nationalist Narratives 
Nationalist patriarchy came into being by appropriating the 
categories of traditional patriarchy in service of the nation. 
But the new discourses of nationalism permitted a re-reading of 
these categories. A 1903 essay on the future of Chinese women 
written by a "certain southern woman" appears to accept the 
historical pieties and cliches about women. She declares that 
there are three special qualities of Chinese women that will 
allow them to surpass the women of Europe and America. Women have 
the heart of steadfastness (iianzhi xin), the heart of 
benevolence (ciai xin), and the heart of vindictiveness (baofu 
a). As in Wangls speech above, she recounts the constancy with 
which women give their love as filial daughters and chaste wives 
despite the severe restraints of a patriarchal ideology. If only 
women were enlightened about the value of the nation, they could 
transfer this steadfast love and undying loyal'ty to the nation. 
Similarly, if with their heart of benevolence and compassion, 
women could achieve education and participate equally in public 
affairs, then the nation would certainly have equality, public 
harmony, and love of the race, which China so utterly lacks. 
Finally, the label of women as vindictive is turned to national 
advantage. Although it is said that a woman's heart is most 
poisonous, the southern woman regards it as women's exceptional 
virtue (te meixinq). The Chinese people lack a sense of hatred 
for, and can even collaborate with, their conquerors. But once 
women can learn about the brutality of the alien Manchus, their 
thirst for revenge will strengthen their hatred and cause them to 
devise plans to oppose them [Chu'nan nuzi 394-51.  
On a first reading the text does all that we have suggested 
above. Nationalist discourse, at least in this early stage, 
appears with a highly patriarchal face that reproduces all the 
stereotypes of the historical discourses of women. And it seems 
to be all the more bizarre coming as it does from a woman writer. 
But a closer reading reveals that the southern woman is engaging 
in a strategic re-reading of nationalism in order to empower 
women. Each of the categories she discusses has been a means of 
subj.ect-ing women, not only in the sense of subordinating them, 
but also by giving them the only categories to think their 
subjectivity or agency. But nationalism gives her a new 
discursive context through which to re-value these categories. By 
investing them with unexpected power, both constructive and 
destructive, she not only seeks to empower women, but potentially 
gives them far greater agency in the nation-building project than 
men who are neither steadfast, compassionate, public-minded, nor 
patriotic. Second, running through the text is the plea that 
these conditions can only be achieved if women receive education. 
The southern woman recognizes that this is an age of opportunity 
for women which must not be missed. There are even enlightened 
men who advocate the education of women. "Although they may not 
truly mean what they say, yet our generation can seize their 
words (iie bi koutouchan zhi li), and implement our real agenda." 
[Chulnan nuzi 3951 While doubtless the cause of women has been 
subordinated to national greatness via the language of tradition, 
I nonetheless find this to be an intriguing piece. When one only 
has the language of the other to speak the self, one can gain . 
agency only by the subversive use of this language. 
Lu Xunls story "Soap" (1924) brings home to us with biting 
clarity the different meanings that this trope of traditional 
woman in the modern era signified for men and women in Republican 
China. Simin has bought a cake of foreign, scented soap for his 
wife. His wife is pleased but also embarrassed by the coded 
message for her to make herself cleaner and more alluring. When 
Simin had wanted to open the soap packaging at the store to check 
its quality, he was taunted by some schoolgirls with bobbed hair 
by a foreign word he does not understand (it turns out to be "old 
fool"). Highly agitated, he now orders his school-going son to 
check its meaning and begins to rave and rant about the moral 
havoc that the new schools are playing on China, especially the 
schools for girls. He says, "Just think it is already in very 
poor taste the way women wander up and down the streets, and now 
they want to cut their hair as well. Nothing disgusts me as much 
as these short-haired schoolgirls. What I say is: There is some 
excuse for soldiers and bandits, but these girls are the ones who 
turn everything upside down. They ought to be very severely dealt 
with indeed..." [Lu 1924, 193; Lu 1960, 1671. 
Simin then goes on to contrast this behaviour with that of a 
filial beggar girl of eighteen or nineteen begging outside a 
store who turned over all the money she received to her blind 
grandmother. The crowds that gathered to watch the two not only 
did not give much money, but made jeering remarks about how she 
would not be bad at all if one scrubbed her up with two cakes of 
soap. Simin sees this as evidence of the catastrophic decline of 
morality in modern China. Later at dinner, when Simin's wife can 
no longer take Simin's irritability through the evening, she 
hints that he secretly harbors sexual longing for the beggar girl 
which he tries to cover up by exalting her filial and self- 
sacrificing conduct. In utter frustration, she exclaims, "If you 
.: i 
' buy her another cake and give her a good scrubbing, then worship 
, . 
her, the whole world will be at peace" [Lu 1924, 199; Lu 1960, 
1711. Later, she adds, "We women are much better than you men. 
If you men are not cursing eighteen or nineteen-year-old girl 
students, you are praising eighteen or nineteen-year-old girl 
beggars: such dirty minds you have..." [Lu 1924, 200; Lu 1960, 
At this moment, Simin is rescued from this tirade by the 
arrival of some friends who have come to remind him about the 
urgent need to publicize the title of the essay and poetry 
contest for their Moral Reform Literary Society (Yifena Wenshe). 
The title of the essay had already been drafted as "To beg the 
President to issue an order for the promotion of the Confucian 
classics and the worship of the mother of Mencius, in order to 
revive this moribund world and preserve our national characteru. 
Thinking about the beggar woman, Simin suggests that poem should 
be titled the "Filial Daughter" to eulogize her and criticize 
society. In the following exchange one of his friends laughs 
uproariously upon hearing the jeering comments about giving her a 
good scrubbing. Simin is acutely pained by his friend's laughter, 
because as Lu Xun hints, it suggests to him the truth of his 
wife's words that he has repressed. 
The story encapsulates the themes of my paper aptly.' Lu Xun 
sets up the duality between Chinese and foreign, East and West, 
old and new as the basic framework of the story. The foreign and 
new--schoolgirls, bobbed-hair, modern education, English words, 
the heavy sound of leather shoes worn by Simin's son--are an 
intrusive and disruptive presence for Simin. Even foreign soap, 
with its scented power to arouse desire, disturbs, confuses and 
agitates him. Indeed, it is clear that what he finds most 
disturbing is the unmooring of gender and sexual .norms. He 
responds not only with the vituperative rhetoric against the need 
for girls to go to school, but with the valorization of the 
conduct of the pure and filial beggar-women. For Simin she 
represents everything that is pure in tradition and he wants the 
poetry contest to enshrine her purity. Yet this is a 
I wish to acknowledge my debt to Carolyn Brown's reading 
of this story, particularly her interpretation of woman in the 
story as trope and as realist figure. "Lu Xun's view of women can 
best be described as androgynous; women's moral insight, like 
that of the dispossessed, derives from seeing society from the 
underside. He demythologizes gender codes, revealing their 
attempt to deflect attention from issues of power by substituting 
issues of sexuality. In this his insights resonate with the most 
contemporary of feminist theorists [Brown, 7 7 1 . "  
representation that has to exalt her poverty (filial even in 
desperate need) and de-sexualize her as the object of men's 
(especially his) desire. Just as much as the rhetoric against 
girls schools, this is a strategy of containment. 
Simin and his friends of the Moral Reform Literary Society 
closely resemble some of the men we will discuss in the Morality 
Society. Like the latter, the former would have been quite happy 
to contain girls within special righteous schools and although 
the latter could have more complex views than the men in Lu Xun's 
satire, they too sought to contain women as the essence of 
tradition-in-modernity. But as Carolyn Brown points out, the one 
person in Lu Xun's story who was able to see through this trope 
of woman was none other than the only woman unrepresented by the 
male characters--Simin8s wife. She writes, "with the character 
Mrs SSumin, he (Lu) empowers a semi-traditional woman with speech 
and the capacity to 're-read the male text,' making her the locus 
of his own value" [Brown 771 .  It is to these latter two themes: 
the constitution, or rather, objectification of woman as subject 
in the Morality Society, and the enunciation of this subject 
position by women themselves--the 're-reading of the male textf-- 
which I shall turn in the remaining pages. 
The Morality Society and the New Patriarchy 
I shall examine here the views of the Morality Society 
(Daodehui) about women and the narratives of its women lecturers 
during the early 1930s under the Japanese puppet state of 
Manzhouguo. The society was founded in Shandong in 1918 and Kang 
Youwei served as its President in the 1920s until he died in 1928 
[MDNJ 1:1]. The society had a strong syncretic religious 
character through much of the 1920s (presumably when Kang was 
alive), but the religious component seemed to have waned by the 
1930s when its focus on morality and charity gained salience. 
Nonetheless, in identifying its source of moral inspiration, a 
leader of the society, Wang Fengyi, suggested that all three 
historical religions in China pointed to the permanence of the 
moral: thus Confucius said that without righteousness, wealth and 
nobility were like passing clouds; Buddhism, that that which has 
form must die; Daoism, that only good and evil are without form 
and so have a long existence. Thus morality persists and gives 
meaning to the universe, and it is the morality of the East that 
will save the universe from the materialism and destructiveness 
of the West [OMS Part 3:1].6 
The Morality Society flourished in Manzhouguo because of 
state support and patronage of its activities and those of 
similar organizations. In 1932, the Manzhouguo branch of the 
Morality Society cut off ties with its headquarters in Beijing 
and came under the supervision of the Manzhouguo government. 
Although it is hardly possible to characterize the attitude of 
this society as an expression of nationalist patriarchy since it 
operated under a puppet regime, many of these modern redemptive 
While expressing his admiration of Wang Yangming's 
advocacy of the truth of the three religions, Wang Fengyi also 
ridiculed Sun Yatsen who declared the priority of knowledge over 
action whereas Wang believed in combining morality with action 
[OMS 3:1]. 
societies in Manzhouguo developed a space of authenticity from 
the same sources as did KMT nationalism or the kind of 
conservative middle class ideology that Lu Xun satirized. While 
nationalists sought to preserve a national essence in the 
evolutionary process, the Morality Society sought to preserve an 
East Asian essence while acknowledging the necessity of material 
evolution [MDNJ 1:l; 4:l-21. 7 
At the time the Morality Society encountered the Manzhouguo 
regime there was a remarkable convergence of ideological 
interests between it and certain currents in Japan. Similar 
"redemptive" societies in Japan, such as the Shibunkai, offering 
Confucianism and Shinto as the spiritual alternative to excessive 
materialism and individualism had begun to grow in strength from 
the 1920s, particularly as economic conditions worsened and 
social unrest grew. Asiatic moral systems emphasizing ethical 
responsibilities were celebrated as alternatives to capitalism 
.- - 
and'Marxism, both Western doctrines (Smith 123-6). By the 1930s, 
the redemptive rhetoric of elite Confucian societies and the 
right wing nationalist and militarists not only began to come 
together but were also assimilated in an active political and 
Although we do not think of Manzhouguo as a nation-state, 
it did, in fact, possess a highly developed rhetoric of a new 
type of nation unifying the different races of the area (xiehe 
-auoiia). However, since its rhetoric had to balance the assertion 
of national independence with its political dependence upon 
Japan, the nation was only one of the "ultimate" communities that 
it emphasized; the other was East Asia. 
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educational program by the Japanese government (Smith 154-166)." 
Thus it was that Manzhouguo state, the real power behind 
which was the Japanese military, had at its disposal an ideology 
and language with which to forge an alliance with the redemptive 
societies in northeast China. Like the KMT government in Nanjing, 
the Manzhouguo government censured the "superstitious" character 
of the redemptive societies, but instead of seeking to eradicate 
the societies themselves, it saw in them the potential for their 
transformation into state-controlled civic organizations 
[Takizawa 82-86, 100-1023. In this new political framework, the 
Morality Society became what in Japanese was called a kvoka 
(iiaohua in Chinese) organization--an agency engaged in welfare 
and enlightenment of the people (see also Gluck 103 and Garon). 
Indeed the transition from a more religious orientation to 
morality and charity in this Society is probably attributable to 
its closer supervision by the state. 9 
The Morality Society was perhaps the most elite Chinese 
organization among all such societies in Manzhouguo. Its 
To be sure this was a synthetic rhetoric that not only 
sought to combine Eastern spirituality with Western civilization, 
but also Confucianism with native Japanese traditions. Japan was, 
especially after the Chinese Republican revolution, depicted as 
the true leader and champion of Confucianism and Eastern 
morality--a depiction which justified intervention in China 
(Smith 145). 
The story of the tensions between the Society and the 
Manzhouguo government over religious worship, account-keeping, 
school curricula, ties with secret societies, as well as 
ideological clashes with progressive groups within Manzhouguo, is 
a very revealing one and belongs to another history [MDNJ 2:14- 
16, 25-35, 42-45]. 
membership and office-holders boasted top officials, merchants, 
and landowners at all levels of Manzhouguo society from the major 
cities to the subcounty townships. The message of peace, morality 
and spiritual salvation of the world by the East befitted these 
successors of the old gentry elite. As a iiaohua agency it 
revealed a strong propagandist urge. It put great stock by its 
cadres or activists (m) who were characterized as benevolent 
and resolute [MDNJ 4:2]. Through their activities in schools, in 
lectures, in spreading baihua commentaries of classical 
morality, in establishing popular enlightenment societies to 
"reform popular customs and rectify the people's minds and 
hearts" the society propounded a strong rhetoric of reaching out 
to all--the rich and poor, men and women [MDNJ 2:36-42; 4:117, 
118; 8:22-233. By 1934, the 312 branches of the Manzhouguo 
society operated 235 "righteous" or "virtuous" schools, 226 
lecture halls, and 124 clinics [MDNJ 1:21]. 
The records of this society allow us to see how it evolved 
historically from the gentry culture of the late empire. In the 
biographies of model figures honored in the 1930s for their 
virtuous and moral actions frequently undertaken in the 1900s and 
1910s before the society was founded [ORMS 1:lO-581, filiality 
and loyalty are often cited. But the bulk of such honors are 
granted to men and women who established, managed or contributed 
money for "virtuous and chaste girls' schools" (zhennu vixue; 
baonu vixuevuan). Moreover, while the biographies of model 
individuals traceable in these records to the late 19th century 
indicate that temple building and repairs were common activities 
in the last years of the 19th century, by the Republican period, 
establishing these schools may have become a more common virtuous 
activity than contributions to building temples or arches to 
chaste widows. Doubtless, the emphasis upon virtuous girls' 
schools developed with the spread of the female education in 
public institutions. We have seen an example of this anxiety in 
Lu Xunfs story and the pages of the journal Funu Zazhi in the 
early 1920s are filled with essays about the problem of having 
boys and girls in the same class (Yan 1923; Wang 1918; Kang 
1918). Virtuous girls' schools represented a core institutional 
means to manage a generalized anxiety about the loosening of 
morals and fundamental values, an anxiety that became 
increasingly focused upon the bodies of females. Thus, one woman 
claimed that she only really understood what it meant to read 
after her father transferred her from a regular school to a 
virtuous school. Learning to read was not a true learning unless 
such a reading could shape the body and its conduct (xinu dao 
shenshanu, na iiao shizi) [ORMS 4:142]. 
The 20th century discourse of female virtue found here is 
clearly continuous with the cult of chaste widows and virtuous 
wives (Elvin, Furth, KO, Chow). The establishment of the virtuous 
schools is couched in the language of this tradition: model men 
and women who have established virtuous schools have been 
inspired by chaste women's biographies in the lienuzhuan as well 
as by the personal examples of chaste widows and virgins in the 
family. But inevitably, there was also a shift in the meaning of 
female virtue. Just as nationalist patriarchy in the KMT 
reorganized the role and meaning of the ideal women, so too, in 
the Morality Society, as the figure of woman pervaded the space 
of authenticity, it became the site for reconstructing tradition. 
Among the records of the society, the Oral Records of 
Morality Seminars of the Third Manzhouguo Morality Society [ORMS] 
held in 1936 in Xinjing (Changchun), is an extraordinarily 
revealing text of over 300 pages of personal narratives and 
testimonials of the leaders and teachers of the society who 
taught in its righteous schools and went around the country 
giving lectures on morality. The bulk of these narratives are 
organized around five categories drawn from the classical 
( to know your fate), zhixinq know your 
nature), iinxin (to devote your heart and mind, to devote 
oneself), lishen (to establish your self or body); in turn lishen 
is divided into lizhi (to resolve your will), and live (to 
fulfill an enterprise or profession), and finally, zhizhi, (to 
know your limits) .I0 Participants in the seminar made 
presentations about how their lives were guided by the 
appropriate morality within each of these categories. We hear the 
life stories of about 25 women and an equal number of men, 
although the total number of speaking men was greater because of 
The Hanvu Da Cidian quotes passages from the 
representative texts in which these categories occur: the first 
can be found in the Yiiinq, the second and third in the Menazi, 
the fourth in the Xiaoiinq, lizhi in the Hou Hanshu, live in the 
Hanii, and zhizhi in the Liii. 
the many introductory speeches made by Manzhouguo civil and 
military officials. From the speeches and narratives of both the 
men and the women, I shall try to construct an image of how woman 
is constituted as a subject. From the personal narratives of the 
women I will try to demonstrate the gap between the constituted 
subject and the enunciating subject. The enunciating subject 
seeks to negotiate this gap in a variety of ways even as she 
derives meaning and spiritual sustenance--identity--from the 
constituting ideology or pedagogy.'' 
The introductory lectures by officials inevitably stressed 
the mediating role of the Society between the state and the 
family. The Manzhouguo police were closely associated with the 
project for moral renewal of the citizenry. The head of the 
Capital Police Bureau declared that in order to attain national 
goals and renew the people, it was first necessary to cleanse the 
people's hearts. While this was the indirect responsibility of 
the nation-state, it was more directly the responsibility of such 
agencies as the Morality Society. Such societies should bond the 
people to the state (auanmin vizhi) by nourishing ethical 
attitudes and duties towards the family, towards society, and 
towards the nation [ORMS 3:4-5, 381. Employing an orthodox 
Confucian rhetoric, these officials repeatedly emphasized the 
I' See Homi Bhabha on enunciation: "The reason a cultural 
text or system of meaning cannot be sufficient unto itself is 
that the act of cultural enunciation - the place of utterance - 
is crossed by the differance of writing ... It is this difference 
in the process of language that is crucial to the production of 
meaning and ensures, at the same time, that meaning is never 
simply mimetic or transparent [Bhabha 361." 
central importance of the five ethical relationships in 
constructing a chain of loyalty to the state.12 This is how 
Tachibana Shiraaki formulated the logic: "Morality is the basis 
of belief, whereas superstition has no basis in morality. The 
youth at home must believe in the elders, the wife in the 
husband, and the husband in the wife. If there is no harmony 
within the family, then there will be no harmony in society and 
no harmony in the nation. The Morality Society thus represents 
the progress (iinbu) of morality" [MDNJ 11:29]. 
The goals of the nation-state could only be fulfilled when 
the family was strong, when husbands were righteous, and wives 
3.- -.. 
' obedient. Within the family, the ideal moral roles for men and 
-- . . women were very different. Masculine virtue emphasized loyalty, 
incorruptibility, bravery and self-restraint. On several 
occasions in their narratives, men recounted as virtue the self- 
control by which they restrained the urge to beat .their wives. 
One of them indicated that in showing restraint he was expressing 
his filiality because both his marriages had been arranged by his 
mother [ORMS 4:221-2231. Director Feng (Fenu iuren) was once 
faced with a serious moral crisis when his youngest wife threw 
his baby son on the floor: seized by a desire to avenge his 
progeny, he was about to strike her when he recognized the virtue 
of self-restraint [ORMS 4 : 9 7 ] .  Female virtue often entailed 
l2 Three of these relationships--between father and son, 
older and younger brothers, husband and wife--concern stabilizing 
family ties, the fourth relationship between friends connects 
horizontally across families, and the fifth between subject and 
monarch links the family to the state. 
following the three obediences (sanconq). The locus classicus of 
this doctrine is the Book of Rituals,(Yili Sanafuzhuan ) which 
writes that a woman should obey her father before marriage, her 
husband upon marriage, and her son upon the husband's death. But 
in the pedagogy of the Society, as we shall see, obedience on the 
part of women did not necessarily entail confinement to the 
household. It was more that the ideal woman was shaped (or 
regulated) by the virtues of the family and by the reproduction 
of these virtues in the righteous schools and the Morality 
Society itself. 
It was thus in the representation of the family, and the 
special role of women within it as repositories of the essence of 
(all that was good in) tradition, that the new middle-class 
patriarchy made common cause with the Manzhouguo state. Woman 
became the upholder of the "new family" which was the basis of 
citi~enshi~.'~ The new family was morally pure, selfless, and 
committed to moral regeneration of the world by adhering to the 
"kingly way" (wanadao) [ORMS 4:134]. Thus weddings were to be 
frugal and unostentatious since the.goal was to achieve love and 
righteousness among the couple [MDNJ 10:6, 12:24]. Women (and to 
a lesser extent, men) were encouraged to rid themselves of 
jewelry and other accoutrements so that they could come to know 
their inner selves [OMS 4:151]. The Morality Society not only 
l3 It is interesting to explore the extent to which this 
discourse on family and the nation-state in Manzhouguo, 
especially before 1941, paralleled or was influenced by other 
mid-century nationalist and fascist discourses in Europe and 
Asia. 
conducted lectures and ran schools, it also organized many 
"family research groups" (iiatina vaniiushe) in which the role of 
model wives and mothers were investigated. It is from these 
research societies that the righteous girls' schools received the 
necessary knowledge to improve womens' service to the family and 
nation without having to leave the home [MDNJ 2:41; 4:27]. l4 
The pedagogy of the Morality Society by no means merely 
reproduced the historical image of the ideal Confucian woman-- 
whatever that may have been. It involved a representation of 
woman that was neither abject nor liberated in the sense of the 
"Western woman". Wang Fengyi, the director of the Moral Culture 
Department of the Manzhouguo government and an inspirational 
leader of the society from its inception, reported a conversation 
with a Christian pastor in which Wang reveals the inadequacy of 
historical religions. Wang declared that he believed in all 
religions since they all pointed to the same Way (m), but he 
protested.that these religions neglected or demeaned women in the 
education of the Way. He insisted that women should be educated 
and independent (live) so that they could understand the Way 
[ORMS 4 : 207 ] .I5 Thus women's education was necessary both from 
l4 Thus, the weekly curriculum of the virtuous girls' 
schools was standardized to devote 2 hours for self-cultivation, 
3 hours for the study of the classics, 5 hours for art, 
needlework, and music, 8 hours for Chinese, 2 hours for Japanese, 
2 for history, 2 for geography, 6 for math, and 2 hours for 
nature study [MDNJ 2:l-31. 
Note however, that Mr. Wang's household was probably very 
patriarchal. When his daughter-in-law was brought in marriage 
into their home, she fell into a depression and returned to her 
uncle's home. Mr. Wang claims that after he spoke to her, she 
the state's perspective of improving the family and home and from 
the Society's perspective of having them understand morality. The 
reconstructed tradition here mobilized an image of woman that 
redefined her in accordance with modern discourse eveiwhile 
claiming a pristine traditionalism/East Asianism at the heart of 
the culture- and nation-building project. 
Women as Enunciating Subjects 
Who were the women who joined these societies, particularly 
as lecturers? As lecturers, they must, at some level have 
believed in the pedagogy. Like teachers everywhere, they 
expressed demoralization when few attended their lectures and 
were gratified by a large turn-out. Many of them were women with 
much grief in their lives. There were those whose children had 
died young, those locked in loveless marriages, those who sought 
solace because a younger.wife or concubine has been brought in to 
replace them, younger wives bullied by older wives and in-laws, 
and many others. Many were devout Buddhists and found the society 
to be basically compatible with their Buddhist faith. These were 
women for whom the Morality Society offered a rationalization or 
justification of their fate, a means of coping with their 
difficult lives and, and often, spiritual solace. A woman named 
Tu declares that hers is the fate (minq) of a stepmother. Neither 
the old nor the children treated her well no matter how hard she 
tried. But she has now come to understand her fate and has 
resolved her will (lizhi). Whereas earlier she had been addicted 
happily returned to their home [ O M S  4:157]. 
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to drugs, now she is a vegetarian and feels no need for drugs. 
Indeed, she has acquired such strength and influence in her 
household that no one in her household takes drugs [ O M S  4:90]. A 
Mrs, Zhao states simply that earlier she would be sad when people 
called her "wife number two" (er taitai). Now she has learnt to 
live with her fate (tianminq) and she is happy [ O M S  4:94]. Mrs. 
Liu's in-laws got a "little sister" (a concubine) for her who was 
filial and sisterly and so she had to learn to be a good elder 
sister. She decided to make up to her in-laws and husband by 
performing service to society which she has done for the past ten 
years [ORMS 4:138]. 
But resignation, coping an,d solace from grief and 
mistreatment were not the only meanings that women derived from 
their participation in the Morality Society. These narratives 
also reveal various strategies whereby women were able to 
maneuver the goals of the society to secure advantage for 
themselves and for other women. This was hardly easy because many 
women must have experienced the interpellative or constituting 
activity as a form of objectification. Counter-representations 
of the modern, westernized woman were readily available to these 
women. Newspapers in Manzhouguo debated the issue of women's 
liberation, and until 1941, at least, often carried positive 
images of the liberated, Western and Westernized women. Indeed, 
it was the often unacknowledged irruption of elements of this 
discourse of the liberated woman into their own that enabled some 
of their maneuvers. Yet it is also clear that they accepted the 
virtue of filiality and even obedience to patriarchs. Most of 
all, they appeared to derive their inspiration and strength from 
the spirit of devotion and self-sacrifice--from that space of 
authenticity carved out by the pedagogy of the society. For us, 
the challenge is to see how they could be true to their 
subjectivity inscribed by the Morality Society while recovering 
some agency as enunciating subjects. 
The first and perhaps most important difference between the 
discourse of these redemptive societies and the historical, 
Confucian or patrilineal discourse on women (see Furth 1990, 
Chow, Elvin) was that the rhetoric of confining women to the home 
in these societies was balanced or countered by a valorization of 
public or social service. Not only did these societies have an 
ideology of public service, they were themselves part of the 
public sphere. As such, women who participated in them as 
members, as audience or as lecturers were ipso f ac to  involved in 
activities outside the home. Recall, even in the official 
articulations of the duty of the society to create a nested 
hierarchy of moral obligation linking the individual to the 
state, the family was not directly linked to the state. This 
relationship was mediated by the need to fulfill a moral 
obligation to society. The realm of society or shehui as a 
positively evaluated sphere of human--male and female-- 
interaction represented a significant, though not necessarily 
recognized, departure from earlier historical discourses 
containing women within the domestic sphere (Furth). Mrs. Zhao 
was one who did recognize the significant difference: "Those of 
you under the age of forty have had the benefit of a modern 
education and may work outside of the home. Those of us over 
forty are barely literate and we know little about affairs 
outside the home. Now this (Morality) society allows us to 
exchange knowledge: I can go to your home and you to mine; we are 
not restricted by being rich or poor ... From this it is clear that 
the future of women is bright. We can come and hear lectures 
everyday; we can obtain morality: the young can be filial to the 
old and the old can be kind. I hope my sisters will strive to 
build the future" [MDNJ 11:30]. 
The realm of the social, however, was emerging as an arena 
of ambiguity and undeclared constestation. Even in Mrs. Zhaols 
comments which reveal a deeply felt sense of liberation, moral 
development afforded by the emergence of the social was 
ultimately brought to bear to restore filiality. While many of 
the men acknowledged the importance of service to society, they 
believed that confining women, though not necessarily to the 
home, was the best possible way for society to develop. Just as 
the virtuous girls1 school was the way to regulate the behaviour 
of girls who were exposed to society, so too, for some of these 
men, women's participation in the Morality Society was itself an 
ideal way to control their activities outside the home. The 
director of the society, Mr. Feng, had four wives all of who, he 
claimed, were happily involved with the Morality Society and 
regularly ketou (kowtow) to its teachers [OMS 4:53]. Not 
everybody in the Society accepted this pattern of containment. 
Indeed, even among the leadership we have noted Mr. Wang's 
espousal of the necessity of women's education and independence. 
Girls and women sometimes reacted collectively to these efforts 
at containment. The investigator of a survey of social welfare 
organizations in Manzhouguo, reported an episode from one of the 
virtuous schools that he witnessed in 1937 in Liaoyuan county. 
The investigator, Takizawa Toshihiro, reported that the 
school and its dormitories were basically well-maintained. It 
derived its income from a wool-weaving workshop and a grain 
store. It had separate lecture halls for women citizens (funu 
shimin) appointed with a picture of the emperor Puyi and an altar 
to Confucius. On one of the days he was there, a vigorous 
discussion on the subject of "the spirit of nation-building and 
women in the family" ,(iianauo iinashen he iiatina funu) followed 
a lecture delivered by a lecturer from Fengtian (Shenyang). 
Takizawa was impressed by the dedication of the students and 
teachers of the school to popular enlightenment and the way in 
which they criticized the old-fashioned attitude of the lecturer. 
Takizawa recommended that rather than preach homilies to these 
children, the Society should emphasize the teaching of practical 
life skills. In this way, they would learn from the 
scienticization (kaaakuka) of everyday life [Takizawa 94-95]. 
Such collective reactions to the discursive and 
institutional efforts to chanel women's behaviour are less 
visible in the personal narratives. Nonetheless, the positive 
evaluation of the realm of the social or public in modern 
ideologies together with the ambivalence of the leaders (contrast 
Feng's behaviour with Wang's comment on religions denying women), 
created opportunities which these women seized and utilized to 
the fullest extent.16 A Mrs. Bai decided to give up the life of 
the inner quarters because she realized that the world of women 
was a very grasping one in which one could not be ethical. By 
giving lectures in society, she could make a living which 
permitted her to support both her mother and mother-in-law. Thus 
she could be filial and moral without being dependent upon 
anyone,' neither husband nor children [ O M S  4:185]. A recently 
married woman accepted the foreordained nature of the daughter- 
in-law to be like water: to serve all in the family with 
devotion--to be filial to her in-laws, help her husband attain a 
Buddhist nation, be kind to her children--and rid herself of vain 
desire. At the same time, women could follow the men and devote 
themselves to social good. Indeed, once one had satisfactorily 
served the in-laws, it was incumbent in the next phase to serve 
the world [ O M S  4: 134-1351. 
Mrs. Chen reveals the significance of public service and the 
independence that it can bring to women. She emphasizes the 
utility and value of women in the family and the importance of 
these qualities in purifying the world and resolving to do good 
l6 In some ways, the realm of the social functioned like the 
"nation" as a legitimating force in providing alternative roles 
for women. As the sphere of collective activity it was certainly 
a most important component or building block of nationalist 
discourse. 
for society. She begins her narrative with an account of how her 
father-in-law brought her into the household because the 
education she received from her mother would bring good values 
into their home. These were the qualities that permitted lishen, 
the ability to establish oneself. In earlier periods, lishen, to 
the extent that it referred to women, referred to feminine bodily 
comportment within the domestic sphere. In a booklet of moral 
instructions for women that circulated in the late imperial 
period, lishen is described as a "way of being tranquil (sing) 
and chaste (zhen). Tranquillity brings purity (u) and chastity 
brings honor (ronq). While walking do not turn back your head; 
while speaking do not expose your teeth; while sitting, do not 
move your knees; while standing, do not raise your voice.....When 
of necessity you have to go out, be sure to veil your face...... 
Only when you establish your body in such proper and upright ways 
(lishen duanzhenq) can you be a person (fana ke weiren)" [Song 3- 
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The close connection between personhood and bodily 
comportment has not disappeared during the Republic. Recall the 
comment of the woman who learnt the true meaning of reading only 
after applying it to her bodily conduct. But this is not how Mrs. 
Chen uses lishen. Personhood for her is dependent upon material 
independence. According to her, the best means of lishen is to 
set up a livelihood of one's own (li~e). Now that Manzhouguo has 
entered the era of Datong or the Great Unity, Mrs. Chen avers, 
women have plenty of opportunity to make a livelihood. Once they 
have set up a living, they can then devote themselves to the task 
of purifying the world (huozhe nena sheshen shuiie). In this 
way, because one would not be working for money or fame, one 
could rid oneself of greed. Was this not the best way to lishen 
[ORMS 4: 181]? 
Several points in this personal narrative deserve attention. 
First, observe the ease with which the meaning of lishen in one 
context (home) is transferred to another (society) where it may 
be subversive of the original context. Crucial to this transfer 
(and subversiveness) is not simply the valorization of social 
service, but the corollary notion of financial autonomy. The 
notion of live, often treated in these narratives as a subset of 
lishen, becomes one of the most important concerns of these women 
as they seek to establish a material base to enable their role as 
moral citizens of the Society and the world. Second, note the 
appropriation of the rhetoric of the Manzhouguo state. Many women 
were purposeful in their use of state rhetoric and tended to 
seize any rhetorical openings to advance the condition of women. 
Finally, there is the conflation of service in the outside world 
and moral purification of this world. It suggests that 
participation in the social world is subordinated to ethical and 
religious goals. These goals occupy the space of authenticity and 
inner meaning for the individual woman, but it is a space that is 
framed by the new patriarchy of the middle class and the state. 
The interweaving of these three elements--appropriation of 
the rhetoric, carving out a space, role and basis for independent 
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social action, and the employment of this autonomy to achieve 
the moral and religious goals of the society--is, adjusting for 
individual details, a recurring pattern in the women's 
narratives. Note how grandmother Cai elides over her unfiliality 
in an era when universal education has become an unquestioned 
value. At the age of thirty-three, grandmother Cai confesses, she 
defied the wishes of the elders and went off to study. Now she is 
a grandmother and it is her responsibility to devote herself 
(iinxin) to the education of her children and grandchildren. She 
closes with the comment that she is a vegetarian, is deeply 
religious and has tried to rid herself of vain desires. Here the 
value of women's education in wider society, in the modernist 
rhetoric of the Manzhouguo state, as well as in strains within 
the Morality Society, allows her to justify an earlier act of 
unfilial behaviour. She finesses filiality, however, not only 
with the superior card of universal education, but also with the 
end-play of devotion to spiritual virtues [ORMS 1371. 
The strategy, if it can be called so, is to detach oneself 
from one kind of pedagogical value but continue to derive meaning 
from the constitutive representation by emphasizing another of 
its qualities or values. Thus while grandmother Cai concluded her 
game leaving the antagonist with the finessed filial card in his 
hands, Mrs. Li, like several others, uses filiality to trump 
unquestioned obedience to her husband. Ever since she heard a 
leader of the society care for his'own mother, Mrs. Li determined 
to set up her own source of livelihood (live) to care for her 
ailing mother. Since she had to go out of the home, her husband 
yelled at her and accused her of being unfaithful. She says that 
she has never loved any man other than her husband. But now her 
loving heart has set [ORMS 4:140]. Mrs. Sun has had to care for 
her sick father and student brother. Her husband has had problems 
at work and cannot provide for all of them. She has,been inspired 
by these wise words of the leaders (shanren): "In devoting 
herself, the woman must not weary the husband; rather she should 
be able to help the husband obtain virtue", to set up an 
independent means of livelihood [ORMS 4:139] .I7 
The ideal of moral autonomy within lishen is sometimes 
interpreted in such a radical way that it subverts the very basis 
of the pedagogy: family values. Thus one Ms. Liu declares that 
her understanding of lishen includes the philosophy of single 
living--the merits of' remaining unmarried (dushen zhuvi sixianq) 
[ORMS 4:188]. We also see a kind of feminist filiality overcoming 
patriarchy. A Mrs. Liu recalls that her mother was ordered back 
to her natal home. She and her brother were not permitted to 
visit her. Later she and her brother devoted themselves to 
restoring the family and she established a source of livelihood 
for her mother [ORMS 4:132]. This woman goes on to challenge the 
sages. She says, "The sages ask us to follow the three male 
l7 A Mrs. Zhu recalled being so driven by anxiety when her 
stepmother arrived after her mother died, that she wore out 
fifteen pairs of shoes. Later she realized that her stepmother 
was not unkind and she herself had been unfilial. So in order to 
make up, she set up a business together with her and her selfish 
feelings have dissolved [ORMS 4:130]. 
figures (sanconq) and learn from our husbands. We listen to our 
husbands, but they do not hear us. My husband eats meat and is 
not very virtuous, whereas I have only eaten meat once and I am a 
filial daughter-in-law. Should I not be the one from whom he 
should learn the Way? But he has been formed early and I am 
incapable of helping him. Anyway I am not much concerned about my 
marriage [ORMS 4:231]." Note, however, even in this last episode, 
the filial link to the mother appears to be the driving sentiment 
for Mrs. Liu. 
Perhaps the episode which best reveals the inseparability of 
the search for autonomy and commitment to the moral values of the 
Society is narrated by the same Mrs. Chen who urged women to take 
advantage of the job opportunities for them in Manzhouguo. "I was 
once sent to Beijing to lecture, but my husband followed me and 
insisted that I return home. Why is it that men can bully women 
so? I asked the teacher (shanren) if I should return. He replied, 
'You may return. What do you have to fear? All you have to know 
is whether or not you have the will'. I returned. In Tianjin I 
was asked whether I returned of my own will. I nearly wept. I 
had resolved to return because I remembered that I could not 
violate my parents' will (minq). The next time I left, I went 
away for four years. And so I am what I am today. The important 
thing is to know your own will (a). It is how and why people 
make up their minds that is important, not the decision itself. I 
believe it is important to be filial... When you have an 
independent income you are not only, as the teacher says, the 
iron master (tie caizhu), you become the golden master (u 
caizhu)" [ORMS 4:181-1821. 
I want to dwell on this moving and complex narrative not 
because of the way in which these women have grasped t'he 
importance of outside service and financial independence, or 
because of the continued importance of filiality. Rather I am 
* 
struck by the thought that the source of strength and resolve for 
this woman derives precisely from the very ideology which 
constrains her in so many other ways. It is by knowing her mind 
and cultivating her resolve (lizhi) that she is able to establish 
her independence from her husband despite the constraints. The 
segment in the records of the proceedings of the conference that 
is most restricting for women is the one titled zhizhi, to know 
the limits. The doctrine that is invoked most often as a 
constraint, and indeed, as self-constraint, is that of the three 
obediences or sanconq. When faced by such constraints one as 
strong and gifted as Mrs. Chen can still pick her way around 
them, but that is not necessarily true for many other women. Mrs. 
Chen acknowledges the importance of these obediences but she does 
not dwell upon them at length. From our fathers, she says, we can 
know our nature, from our husbands our fate, and through our sons 
we can establish ourselves (lishen). She does not elaborate upon 
what she means by lishen here, but moves immediately to the 
differences in the ways in which her parents were "good people" 
and the way she can be a morally pure person. Her parents were 
good people of a village or county; she is a good citizen of the 
entire nation, and indeed, the world [ORMS 4:227-2281.  Once again 
she invokes the expanded community of moral service to elude 
these constraints. 
But not all the women were as skilful as Mrs. Chen. Mrs. 
Zhao says that her greatest aspiration is to be a man, so much so 
that she sometimes forgets that she is a woman. But her nature is 
that of a woman, her mind is that of a woman and her body is that 
of a woman. She needs to remind herself constantly about these 
constraints [OMS 4 : 2 1 9 ] .  Another woman cites the sages to 
acknowledge to herself that a woman must recognize her limits in 
her duty to observe the three obediences [ORMS 4 : 2 2 0 ] .  Mrs. Liu 
believes that because she has a woman's heart, she was not filial 
to her in-laws and did not obey her husband (conafu). Thus they 
brought in a "sister" into the household. Now she has tried to 
be a good wife and obeys her husband dutifully. Although they are 
poor, they are pure inside [ORMS 4 : 2 3 6 ] .  
I have cited the constraints at the end in order to remind 
myself of the limits of interpretation, to acknowledge the extent 
to which the pedagogy did shape the subject. Yet I have been 
amazed by the degree to which the enunciating subject was able to 
construct a sphere of autonomous activity. To be sure, there were 
divisions of opinion among the men of the Morality Society itself 
that gifted women were able to exploit. But I would like to 
propose that discourses and representations which constitute the 
reality of the individual are unable to prevent the irruption of 
elements from alternative or ambient discourses into their 
language, in this case the irruption of elements from the 
discourse of the modern woman. This transformation is often 
disguised by the continued usage of an older language which has 
come to signify a different, newer meaning (a process fashionably 
known as metalepsy), as with the transformation of lishen and 
live which accompanied the emergence of the social realm. 
Discursive irruption into the interior space of authenticity from 
alternative discourses did not occur only among conservative or 
traditional-izing societies. While the May 4th view of the 
nation had little place for the tropes of the past, there was a 
discursive split in its imagery of woman. In the wartime writings 
and propaganda of many May 4th activists, the nation was depicted 
in the historical figure of'a chaste woman raped by an aggressor- 
-an irruption of both past and contemporary, conservative 
representations of woman and nation into its interior space of 
authenticity. 18 
At the same time, the women's enunciation of the rhetoric of 
the Morality Society should not be mistaken as purely 
instrumental manipulation. These women were not one-dimensional 
rational actors who manipulated language to maximize their 
utility. Some recent critiques of the idea of hegemony come 
dangerously close to such a position. James Scott's interesting 
work on subaltern groups who pay lip service to or use the 
l8 Surely there is a link between this discursive split and 
the CCP representation of woman's purity described by Meng Yue 
above. 
"hegemonic" ideology to pursue practices from a hidden transcript 
suggests a flexible view of ideology which is welcome, but its 
instrumentality is overdrawn. The women lecturers of the 
Morality Society were people who maneuvered the language in the 
same moment as they were constituted by it. The moral and 
spiritual goals that pervaded the space of authenticity enabled a 
defiance of pedagogy even while they limited the behaviour and 
identities of these women. In this way, the inviolability of the 
authentic space itself was not affected. It remained unchallenged 
and continued to both inspire and constrain subjects. But its 
meaning was changed. 
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